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DUAL-USE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: THE
CONTEMPORARY ALTERNATIVE TO HIGH-TECH EXPORT
CONTROLS
Michael D. Klaus*
I. INTRODUCTION

In the modem global economy, U.S. export controls crafted during the height
of the Cold War' are failing to forestall the transfer of advanced dual-use
technology 2 to potential adversaries: China secured the necessary equipment to
construct semiconductor manufacturing facilities capable of revolutionizing the
People's Liberation Army,3 Russia deployed an extensive fleet of intelligence
satellites using its own technology, 4 and with sufficient financial resources,
countless other foreign militaries are capable of building competitive
communicants, remote sensing, and navigation satellites without U.S.

J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center. Received a B.A. in Economics, International
Affairs, and Management from Xavier University.
I. The U.S. continues to regulate exports of goods and technologies with military applications
under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) of The Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979
(50 U.S.C. app. § 2401). See generally R. Aylan Broadbent U.S. Exports Controls on Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies: Is the High-Tech Industry Suffering? 8 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 49 (1999).
See also infra Part ll(B).
2. Dual-use technology is technology that can be used for commercial or military purposes.
Examples include carbon fibers (used in skis, golf clubs, and ballistic missiles), maraging steel (used for
centrifuge rotors that enrich uranium for nuclear weapons), corrosion resistant valves (the essential
components in plants that enrich uranium to nuclear weapon grade, which are also widely used in oil
and gas industries), and semiconductors (computer chips used in virtually all commercial electronics
and military technologies). See Hearingson U.S.-ChinaCommission Export Controls and China, 107th
Cong. 1071-77 (Jan. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Hearings on US-China] (prepared Statement of Gary
Milhollin, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control), in COMPILATION OF HEARINGS HELD
BEFORE THE U.S. CHINA SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION (2002).
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF ANN. REP ON THE MILITARY POWER OF THE P.R.C. 39-42 (2003),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/2003073Ochinaex.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2003)
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]; Export Controls: Rapid Advances in China Semiconductor Industry
Underscore Need for Fundamental U.S. Policy Review, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF ANN. REP TO THE
RANKING MINORITY LEADER MEMBER, COMMITrEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFF

U.S. SENATE (2002),

available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02620.pdf (last visited July 30, 2003) [hereinafter Export
Controls]; Michael Klaus, Red Chips: Implications of the Semiconductor Industry Relocation to
China,29 ASIAN AFF AN AM. REV. 237 (2003).
4. See JAMES A. LEWIS, PRESERVING AMERICA'S STRENGTH IN SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY: A
REPORT OF THE CSIS SATELLITE COMMISSION 5 (2002).
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components. 5 Since the U.S. no longer maintains a monopoly on the world's most
sophisticated technologies, 6 unilateral restrictions on high-tech exports are more
prone to impairing U.S. corporations than protecting national security. 7 Despite
intense lobbying campaigns of industry representatives, 8 Congress has repeatedly
eschewed substantive revisions to U.S. export administration regulations, 9 thereby
prolonging the futile effort to impede the technological advancements of distrusted
foreign nations by restricting U.S. exports.
China's astonishing technological and military advancements lie at the center
of the export control debate as U.S. exporters demanding opportunities to sell
advanced technology to China's explosive high-tech industries clash with policy
analysts apprehensively forecasting strategic concerns in the Taiwan Strait.' 0
Favoring the dynamic national security concerns, the U.S. restricts exports of dualuse technology (technology that can be used for commercial or military purposes)
to China under U.S. Export Administration Regulations," although few other
governments impose such cumbersome rules. 12 Consequently, foreign corporations
are securing lucrative high-tech contracts, U.S. exporters are losing billions in
sales,' 3 and China is rapidly acquiring the advanced technology that it desires to
build a formidable modem military 14
While export controls defy the fundamental tenets of the global marketplace,
ongoing negotiations for free trade agreements (FTAs)' 5 with Chile, Singapore,
and Latin America embrace the global competition that is rendering export
controls obsolete.i 6 The Bush administration's ambitious campaign to negotiate
5. Id. at 14.
6. See infra Part Ill(A).
7. See, e.g., Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1019-24 (Prepared Statement of James
Lewis, Director, Technology Policy, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
8. See AlA, EIA, NDIA Call on Bush to More Rapidly Reform Export System, DEF DAILY INT'L,
Feb. 8, 2002, at I.
9. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Tech Leaders Vow to Push for Eased Export Controls, KNIGHT
RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, May 28, 2003, at 1. See also infra note 55 and accompanying text.
10. See generally ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 3, at 43-50.
11. See infra Part II(B).
12. See Christopher F Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on
Technology Transfers in the Post Cold War, Post 9/11Era, 25 Hous. J. INT'L L 441 (2003). See also
infra Part li1(A).
13. See infra Part Ill(B).
14. Enabled by modem technology, China has 450 short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan
and is adding seventy-five more each year. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
15. Under free trade agreements (FTAs), "member countries agree to eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers on trade in goods within the FTA, but each country maintains its own trade policies,
including tariffs on trade outside the region. William H. Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on
U.S. Trade and Implicationsfor US. Trade Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR
CONGRESS
2
(2002),
available
at
http://www.usembassycanada.gov/content/canusa/
freetrade crs 040902.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2003).
16. The U.S. signed an FTA with Singapore in May 2003 and with Chile in June 2003.
Negotiations are ongoing with Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and
Costa Rica, among others. See, e.g., Daniel T. Griswold, Free Trade Agreements: Steppingstones to
More Open World, Center for Trade Policy Studies, Trade Briefing Paper no. 18, at 2 (July 10, 2003),
at http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/briefs/tbp-018.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2003).
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FTAs hails the economic and political benefits for parties to the agreements, 7 but
on a global scale, the effects of U.S. free trade agreements on China's developing
high-tech sectors must also be considered. Judging by the aftermath of the U.S.
Jordan free trade agreement signed in 2001,'8 as an economic matter, budding
high-tech centers in countries with which the U.S. has a free trade agreement
attract immediate investments from U.S. companies and once U.S. investment
facilitates further development, foreign investment follows.' 9 Unlike existing
export controls, the secondary result of such a strategic free trade agreement is that
increased competition in technology markets siphons some dual-use technology
investments from China, thus mitigating the national security risks of burgeoning
technology bases in the control of a potential foe without undermining U.S.
economic interests.20
To establish a practical frame for the defense trade policy debate, this article
begins by presenting the extraordinary growth of China's semiconductor industry
and the military applications of China's emerging technologies. After evaluating
the relevant technology Part Two outlines the history of U.S. export controls
under the Export Administration Act and surveys the persisting fears concerning
China's unprecedented military advances. Finally, Part Two discusses attempts to
control dual-use technology exports on an international level during the Cold War
era via the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) and
during the post-Cold War era through the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies.
Part Three provides anecdotal evidence of the failures of high-tech export
controls and analyzes the institutional weaknesses of international agreements
designed to impede dual-use technology transfers. Extending the case study of
China, the section illustrates the ease at which two of China's largest
semiconductor foundries procured the equipment necessary to produce sensitive
technology from foreign sources. Additionally, Part Three assesses the lack of
enforcement power of the Wassenaar Arrangement and evaluates the practices of
foreign governments in monitoring high-tech exports. Part Three concludes by
presenting the economic losses of obstructive dual-use export controls for U.S.
technology corporations seeking to capitalize on China's expanding business
opportunities.
Once the futility of export controls is delineated, Part Four considers the
strategic possibilities and implications of free trade agreements. The section
begins by reviewing the strategic trade theories underlying FTA negotiations; by
eliminating barriers to trade between contracting parties, FTAs divert investment
from the most efficient countries to less efficient countries. 2' In instances in which
17. Id.
18. See generally mnfra Part IV(D).
19. See Amjad Baker, Intel Plans Investments in Jordan IT Sector AL-BAWABA (Jordan), June
18, 2001, available at http://www.intaj.net/news/readnews.cfm?id = 136 (last visited Nov. 18, 2003). See
also infra Part IV(D)(I).
20. See infra Part IV(A).
21. Griswold, supra note 16, at 1.
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it is politically desirable, the U.S. can manipulate FTAs to support market reforms
in developing countries and construct a template for broader trade agreements. 22
To broaden the strategic trade theories, the section cites evidence from the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement to posit that when FTAs guide dual-use technology Investments, FTAs
also advance national security interests. Finally, in Part Five, a conclusion is
reached that an entirely new paradigm for defense trade policy must replace insular
appeals for export control reforms. By accommodating and leveraging the global
competition inherent in today's marketplace, FTAs protect U.S. corporate interests
and serve as a valuable tool for addressing the national security concerns of
China's technology-driven military modernization.
II. EXPORT CONTROLS ON DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY

A. China s Explosive High Tech Industry
The rapid growth in China's semiconductor (computer chip) industry 23 elicits
widespread trepidation and affords a practical basis for critiquing the role of export
controls in managing national security concerns. 24 As global economic integration
facilitates access to foreign markets, technology companies such as Motorola, Dell,
and Texas Instruments are increasingly outsourcing manufacturing of
semiconductors to foundries,25 which produce semiconductors on a contract basis
and allow their customers to concentrate on research and development.26 Offered
generous tax incentives and government-funded technology parks, 27 international
investors are flocking to China to establish semiconductor foundries that can serve
the needs of manufacturers of devices ranging from helpful hearing aids to

22. Id. at5.
23. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1028-34 (prepared statement of George
Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association) ("[Il]inevitably, China will be the center of
semiconductor manufacturing."). Bryan Lee, Chartered Eyes Stronger Presence in China, STRAIT
TIMES (Singapore), Feb. 22, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, Strait Times (Singapore) File (China's chip
production is expected to increase by 40% annually, while the industry annual growth rate is 10%.).
See generally Klaus, supra note 3, at 238-242.
24. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 955 (prepared statement of James J. Jochum,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration) ("China, itself, can be viewed as
microcosm of the challenges we face as export control officials.").
25. The foundry market is expected to grow at a 20% annual rate with sales growing from $7.5
billion in 2002 to $32 billion by 2010. Mark LaPedus & Brian Fuller, Fab Costs, Capacity Glut Seen
Pointing to Consolidation Shakeout Looms for Foundries, ELEC. ENG. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at I,
LEXIS, News Library Electronic Engineering Times File. See also TI to Buy More Chinese Made
Products, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 5, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, All News File.
26. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1029-31 (prepared statement of George
Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association).
27. See JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, WHITE PAPER: NATIONAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE GLOBAL
MIGRATION OF THE U.S.
SEMICONDUCTOR
INDUSTRY 4 (June 2003),
available at
http://www.senate.gov/-lieberman/semi.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2003). See also Export Controls,
supra note 3, at 3.
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alarming laser-guided missiles.28 In turn, the semiconductor foundries throughout
East Asia rely heavily upon U.S. semiconductor equipment to produce the chips, as
U.S. companies supply 55% of the world's semiconductor equipment and possess
the most advanced technologies.29
While foreign investment pours into their technology parks, Chinese leaders
tout the "importance of developing "independent, proprietary high-technology

capabilities as a means to boost China's economic and military prowess to counter
'hegemonic' actions of the United States." 30 Since semiconductors have direct
military applications, Roger Cliff from Rand Corporation speculates, "China's

grand strategy is to develop a world-class electronics industry and draw on it for
military applications if needed. ''3i Indeed, the semiconductor industry is designated

as a "pillar industry" in China's Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005).32 Under the
Plan, the Chinese government pledges to invest US$18 billion in the sector and
aspires to attract $10 billion from foreign corporations in order to construct twentyfive new semiconductor plants by 2005. 3 Additionally in the past decade, China's
State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) has granted $725 million to
eighty-four state-sponsored research centers 34 in an effort to expand
Shanghai's
3
semiconductor output from $2 billion in 2000 to $24 billion in 2010. 5
Seeking electronic components capable of executing multiple functions, the
military established the foundation for today's advanced semiconductors in 1959
with the invention of the integrated circuit (IC). 36 Since that time, applications for
37
semiconductors have expanded far beyond the domain of the military
semiconductors are considered the 'crude oil' of the twenty-first century, fueling

28. Export Controls,supra note 3, at 9 ("[China's] improvements in semiconductor manufacturing
capability are the direct result of the involvement of European, Japanese, and U.S. integrated circuit
manufacturers in China, typically through joint ventures or wholly foreign owned manufacturing
facilities.").
29. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1119 (prepared statement of the
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International).
30. The U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, Report to Congress of the US.
China Security Commission: The NationalSecurity Implications of the Economic Relationship Between
the United States and China, U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REv.COMMISS. ANN. REP ch. 2 (July 2002),
available at http://www.uscc.gov/anrp.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004).
31. George Leopold, New China, Old Worries, ELEC. ENG. TIMES, Apr. I, 2002, at I, LEXIS,
News Library, Electronic Engineering Times File.
32. See Shanghai Government Vows USD 9 Billion Investment in IC Sector over Next Five Years,
CHINA IT & TELECOM REP Mar. 29,2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, All News File.
33. Id.
34. China Implements Hi-tech Plans to Boost Industry, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 7,
2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, XINHUA File.
35. See, e.g., Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1026 (prepared statement of Daryl Hatano,
Vice President, Semiconductor Industry Association).
36. See Micron Technology, Inc., Semiconductor History, at http://www.micron.com/kl2/
semiconductors/history.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Micron Technologies, Inc.].
37 Thirty years ago, U.S. semiconductor companies were primarily defense contractors; military
systems and commercial IT products now rely on the same producers. See generally Hearings on USChina, supra note 2, at 1029 (prepared statement of George Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry
Association).
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everything from cheap toys to military surveillance satellites.38 Before the U.S.
China Economic and Security Review Commission, 39 an industry expert testified,
"the ability to produce integrated circuits is now a widespread commercial
prospect, with military meeting its needs through off-the-shelf procurement rather
40
than through designing chips for special military applications.
Although China (and other potentially hostile regimes) would be able to
produce adequate military technology with readily available, past-generation
semiconductors, 4 1 the cutting edge 0.1 3-micron semiconductors 42 manufactured in
China's leading foundries are essential for critical defense technology such as
synthetic aperture radar, electronic warfare, and image compression and
processing.43 On a broader scale, policy analysts predict, "advantages will go to
states that have a strong commercial technology sector and develop effective ways
to link these capabilities to their national defense industrial base. 44 Observing
China's ominous military modernization,45 in the U.S. and Taiwan, anxiety
47
abounds 46 as the tiny circuitry of 12-inch, sub-0.18-micron semiconductor chips
manufactured in China's foundries propels technology into the next generation and

38. Micron Technology, Inc., supra note 36.
39. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission was created in 2000 by the
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 § 1238, Pub. L. No. 106-398, 114 Stat.
1654A-334 (2000) (22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2001)) to "monitor, investigate, and to report to Congress an
annual report on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship
between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and to provide recommendations, where
appropriate, to Congress for legislative and administration action.
U.S.-China Security Review
Commission, United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission Charter available at
http://www.uscc.gov/act.htm (last visited July 30, 2003).
40. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1121 (prepared statement of the Semiconductor
Equipment and Materials International).
41. For instance, the U.S. Air Force's new F-22 tactical fighters use 0.8-micron chips, technology
which is four generations behind current industry standards. Export Controls,supra note 3, at 16.
42. In 2002, the width of state-of-the-art semiconductors was 0.13 microns (the width of human
hair is about 100 microns). The industry plans to deliver 0.09 micron chips in 2004, and Intel already
produced such technology. The primary benefit of the decrease in width is the ability to add more
transistors to the chip, thus improving processing speed and overall performance. See SEMICONDUCTOR
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, THE INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY ROADMAP FOR SEMICONDUCTORS 31-32

(2001), available at http://public.itrs.net/ (last visited July 30, 2003). See also John Dodge, Let' Get
Small,
Bio-IT
WORLD,
Aug.
13,
2002,
available
at
http://www.bioitworld.com/archive/081302/horizons_small.html (last visited July 30, 2003). See also Export Controls,
supra note 3, at 13-20.
43. See LIEBERMAN, supranote 27, at I.
44. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, Computer Technology and National Security, in
COMPUTER EXPORTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN A GLOBAL ERA - NEW TOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY

I (2001), available at http://www.csis.org/tech/pubs/0106bLewis.pdf (last visited July 2, 2003). In
China, the majority of its semiconductor foundries are partnerships between foreign investors and the
Chinese government. See Export Controls, supra note 3, at 12.
45. See generally ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3.
46. See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 27, at 10 ("We are being confronted by one of the greatest
transfers of critical defense technologies ever organized by another government.").
47 12-inch refers to the diameter of the computer chips, while 0.18 micron refers to the width of
the chip. In 2001, 0.18-micron was considered to be state-of-the-art, and three Chinese foundries are
now capable of meeting such specifications. See, e.g., Export Controls,supra note 3, at 10.
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transforms commercial and military capabilities.

48

B. U.S. Export Administration Regulations
Where there is real and credible evidence that the export of dual-use items
threatens our national security, we must act to combat that threat. No company
wants to see its name in the headlines of the Los Angeles Times or some other
newspaper as the source of some critical item or technology that facilitatedan act
of terrorism.

-Kenneth Juster, U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration

49

To "minimize transfers of technology that could contribute to potentially
threatening modernization efforts, the U.S. requires licenses for exports of goods
with conceivable military applications. 50 At the conclusion of World War i,
Congress enacted the Export Control Act (ECA) of 1949 which directed the
Commerce Department to impose export controls on goods in short supply or
goods affecting national security and foreign policy. After the ECA expired in
1969 the Export Administration Act of 1969 filled the void, and the act was
eventually updated and amended to become the Export Administration Act (EAA)
of 1979 52 The EAA expired on August 20, 1994 and without a permanent EAA,
President Clinton invoked his authority under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act 53 to reauthorize the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR)- of the EAA. 4 Since Clinton's initial Executive Order, there have been
seven failed attempts to enact a permanent EAA, obliging the President to annually
invoke emergency orders and reauthorize export administration regulations that are
based on statutory authority that "has not been comprehensively revised or
overhauled in [twenty-three] years." 55
As stipulated in the statutory authority of the EAR, export control policies are

48. See generally Export Controls,supra note 3.
49. BIS Chief Juster Reveals Export Control and Security Prioritiesfor 2003, MANAGING

at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/news/2002/
available
2002,
July
KJusterUWKeynoteCA04 16 02.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2003).
EXPORTS,

50. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 950 (prepared statement of Lisa Bronson, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counter proliferation).
and Secunty, History of Export Controls, at
51. U.S. Bureau of Industry
http://bxa.fedworld.gov/mission.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2003).
52. The Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (50 U.S.C. app. § 2401).
53. 50 U.S.C. § 1702.
54. Exec. Order No. 12,924, 59 Fed. Reg. 162 (Aug. 19, 1994).
55. Most recently, the proposed Export Administration Act of 2003, H.R. 55, 108 1h Cong. (2003)
h
(the House version of S. 149, 107' Cong. (2001)), which aimed to streamline the export control review
process and decontrol items readily available from foreign sources, was introduced on January 7, 2003.
Since being referred to the House Committee on International Relations, no action has been taken on
H.R. 55. See generally Kenneth I. Juster, Under Secretary of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and
Security, Keynote Address (Oct. 10, 2002), available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/news/
2002/ken2u@updateO2.htm (last visited July 30, 2003) [hereinafter Juster].
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intended to encourage free trade with all countries, "except those with which such
trade has been determined by the President to be against the national interest. 56
Exercising his power to delegate responsibilities for such determinations, 57 the
President entrusts the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security
(formerly known as the Bureau of Export Administration) to administer and
enforce export controls.5 s In accordance with Executive Order 12,981,59 the Bureau
of Industry and Security then consults with the Departments of State, Defense, and
Energy, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency upon receiving
applications for export licensesi 0 As a full partner in the interagency export license
review process, 61 the Department of Defense in particular is reputed to favor
national security interests over the commercial interests of U.S. exporters when
considering export licenses.62 According to Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, as it relates to
China, export licenses are denied only if they make a "direct and significant" or
"material" contribution to China's military capabilities.63 Nonetheless, in the likely
scenario of a conflict between economic and national security interests, Vann H.
Van Diepen, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation,
affirms, "export controls must uphold U.S. national security and foreign policy "64
Acting without strict guidelines for permissible exports, the governmental
agencies approve or disapprove export licenses on a case-by-case basis. 65 Although
export controls regulate exports of dual-use technologies to every country in the
world, the level of control that is exerted depends, in part, on destination of the
export. 66 Accordingly few licenses are required when exporting a dual-use good to
a NATO ally that is also a member of a nonproliferation regime, while a virtual
embargo is imposed on exports to Iraq, Libya, and Iran. 67 Meanwhile, most

56. 50 U.S.C. § 2402(1) (2003).
57 50 U.S.C. § 2403(e) (2003).
58. See U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, Policies and Regulations, at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/
policiesandregulations/index.htm#ear (last visited July 10, 2003).
59. Exec. Order No. 12,981,60 Fed. Reg. 236 (Dec. 5, 1995).
60. See Corr, supra note 12, at 469-71.
61. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 949 (prepared statement of Lisa Bronson, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counter proliferation)..
62. See Corr, supra note 12, at 470 ("As may be expected, the Defense Department takes a
conservative, security-oriented posture, and is much less concerned with the effect of license denials on
U.S. exporters.").
63. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 950 (prepared statement of Lisa Bronson, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counter proliferation). See also 15
C.F.R. § 742.4(b)(2) (2003).
64. Hearingson US-China, supra note 2, at 1034 (prepared statement of Vann H. Van Diepen,
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation) ("[I]nevitably, China will be the center
of semiconductor manufactunng.").
65. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 949 (prepared statement of Lisa Bronson, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counter proliferation).
66. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 956 (prepared statement of James J. Jochum,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration).
67. Id.
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exports to China require licenses. 68 As mandated by the EAR, the Bureau of
Industry and Security also considers foreign availability of the relevant good when
reviewing applications for export licenses. 6 9 However, even if the technology is
widely available from foreign competitors, the approval of an export license is still
not a guarantee. Following the ambiguous case-by-case policy, Lisa Bronson
maintains, "no70 single factor is going to be the only reason that we make a decision
on a license.",
As part of the interagency review process, when a U.S. corporation applies for
an export license to sell dual-use technology to a Chinese company Commerce
officials endeavor to determine whether sales to the particular Chinese importer
would endanger national security 7i As of 2001, nineteen entities in China were
considered national security threats and thus exports to those entities are
prohibited, 72 while licenses to export to non-banned entities are granted on the
aforementioned case-by-case basis. To gain greater insight into the risks posed by
specific Chinese importers, the Bureau of Industry and Security negotiated an enduse visit arrangement with China in July 1998. 73 With China's consent, the Bureau
of Industry and Security conducted forty-two end-use checks in China in 2001,74
but there are still over 700 outstanding checks. 75 The Chinese government
ultimately retains the authority to determine whether the Commerce Department is
permitted to conduct on-site end-use checks so it nearly impossible to accurately
determine whether an exported good will be applied to civilian or military use.76
To accommodate technological advances in the early 1990s, the U.S. relaxed
high-tech export controls in 1995, believing that it would boost the domestic
economy, which in turn would enhance national security 77 Since then, the
direction of export control polices has reversed course, and regulations on dual-use
exports have become more restrictive. 78 Beginning in October 1998, Congress
recognized that the military's role in the interagency export license review process
had been "significantly and improperly reduced over the years, and a new
Pentagon position was created to specifically monitor transfers of dual-use

68. Id.
69. 50 U.S.C. § 2403(c) (2003). See also 15 C.F.R. § 768.1 (2003).
70. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 981 (Panel I Discussion and Questions and
Answers).
71. See, e.g., Export Controls, supra note 3, at 23.
72. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 964 (Panel I Discussion and Questions and

Answers).
73. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 985 (prepared statement of Michael J. Garcia,
Assistant Secretary, Office of Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce).
74. Id.
75. Export Controls, supra note 3, at 28.
76. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 985-86 (prepared statement of Michael J. Garcia,
Assistant Secretary, Office of Export Enforcement, Department of Commerce).
77. See Jeff Gerth and Enc Schmitt, Chinese Said to Reap Gains of US. Export Policy Shift, N.Y
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1998, at AI (stating that after amendments in 1995, more than $1.9 billion in annual
trade with China that was previously under government scrutiny was removed, and after the policy
change $3 billion in dual-use semiconductor technology was exported to China from 1995-1998).
78. See Corr, supra note 12. See also Leopold, supra note 31, at 92.
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technology into China.79 Startled by reports that exported technology was abetting
Chinese military modernization, former CIA director James Woolsey bemoaned,
"what's particularly troubling is that the massive decontrol in the last few years of
the export of dual-use technology in general, and specifically to China, has made it
almost impossible for the U.S. to monitor where such technology has gone much
less exercise control over it." 80 Similar concerns resurfaced during the
government's Spring 2003 review of defense trade policy 81 Regarding China as a
potential future adversary with a military that is being strengthened by
sophisticated semiconductors and international investors, Rep. Dana Rohrabacher
on those countries that could be
(R-CA) argued, "we need to put heavy restrictions
82
potential enemies, like communist China.,
In spite of Export Administration Regulations, between 1988 and 1998, the
Commerce Department approved over $15 billion in dual-use exports to China,
some of which "went directly to China's leading nuclear, missile, and military sites
- the main vertebrae in China's strategic backbone. 8 3 In 2001, the Bureau of
Industry and Security received over 1,300 applications from U.S. exporters seeking
to sell more dual-use technology to China; of those applications, 936 were
approved, thirty were denied, and 325 were returned to the applicants for more
information.8 4 Although over 70% of dual-use export license applications are
initially approved, the bureaucratic regulations inhibit the business plans of all
potential exporters of ephemeral technology- the average processing time for an
application to export a dual-use good to China was seventy-two days in 2002.85
Adding to the burdens for U.S. exporters, approved licenses ordinarily contain
numerous restrictions for the exporters, such as prohibiting re-exporting the item or
using the item in a manner not specified in the license application. 6
C. MultilateralExport Control Agreements
In addition to domestic dual-use export restrictions, throughout the Cold War,
the U.S. and its allies vigilantly enforced the rules of the Coordinating Committee
which blocked transfers of dual-use
for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom),
87
technologies to the Communist Bloc.
Since all members encountered a common threat (the Warsaw Pact and

79. Gerth and Schmitt, supra note 77 at A14.
80. Id.
81. See Dennis Kennelly & Ben Stone, Bush Team Reviewing Defense Trade Policy, NAT'L DEF
Apr. 1,2003, at 48.
82. Puzzanghera, supra note 9, at 1.
83. Hearingson US-China, supranote 2, at 1072 (prepared Statement of Gary Milhollin, Director,
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control).
84. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 957 (prepared statement of James J. Jochum,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration).
85. Juster, supra note 55.
Hearingson US-China, supra note 2, at 957 (prepared statement of James J. Jochum,
86. See, e.g.,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration).
87. See, e.g., Coff, supra note 12, at 450-455.
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China) and a common objective (undermining the Warsaw Pact and hindering
Chinese technological advancement) CoCom was relatively successful in
achieving its goals.8 s As the Cold War ended and the perceived security threats
subsided, however, the U.S. and Europe curtailed export controls, and CoCom was
officially disbanded in March 1994.89
After CoCom dissolved, the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Technologies attempted to fill the
void and "contribute to regional and international security and stability by
promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms
and dual-use goods and technologies." 90 Signed by thirty-three countries including
Japan and most of Western Europe, parties to the Arrangement pledged to impose
strict export controls to limit transfers of sensitive dual-use goods and technologies
for military end-use. 91 However, unlike CoCom, the Wassenaar Arrangement is not
legally binding, so countries are permitted to devise independent export
administration policies without breaching international law 92
Using the Wassenaar Arrangement's open forum for coordinating
international exports of dual-use technology, members agree to report denials of
export licenses to other members within sixty days.93 Once countries are notified
that another country denied a certain export, under Wassenaar Arrangement
provisions, countries are still allowed to approve a license for an identical item and
thus 'undercut' the original country that denied the license.94 The only restriction
on 'undercutting' is that if a country approves an export that was prevented by
another country within three years, the country granting the export license must
inform all other members within sixty days of the issuance of the license. 95 Rather
than promoting international security, the result of such reporting mechanisms can
be counterproductive; the country denying an export license essentially notifies all
other members of a sales opportunity 96
Contrary to CoCom, the Wassenaar Arrangement is also not specifically

88. See generally DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD (DSB) TASK FORCE ON GLOBALIZATION AND
SECURITY, FINAL REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON GLOBALIZATION AND
SECURITY 26 (1999), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/globalization.pdf (last visited June 10,
2003) [hereinafter DSB FINAL REPORT].
89. See, e.g., Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, History of the Wassenaar Arrangement, at
http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/History.html (last visited Aug. I, 2003).
90. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies, July 12, 1996, art. I(1), available at http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/IE96.html (last
visited Nov. 30, 2003) [hereinafter The Wassenaar Arrangement].
91. Id. at art. 1(3).
92. Id. at art. 11(4); See also Broadbent, supranote 1,at 50.
93. The Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 90, at art. V(3); See also Hearings on US-China,
supra note 2, at 969-70 (Panel I Discussion and Questions and Answers).
94. The Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 90, at art. 11(4)
("Notification of a denial will not
impose an obligation on other Participating States to deny similar transfers.").
95. Id.
96. Jamil Jaffer, Strengtheningthe Wassenaar Export ControlRegime, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 519, 522
(2002).
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directed to prevent technology transfers to certain regimes, 97 and the Arrangement
is thus weakened by the "absence of a single large threat and lack of agreement
over the nature and seriousness of the smaller threats." 98 Even if member countries
recognize the military value of certain dual-use technologies, those countries are
not obligated to acknowledge the international security threat posed by exporting
the item to a country such as China. 99 According to the U.S. General Accounting
Office, "The U.S. is the only member that considers the relationship between
semiconductor manufacturing and military end uses sufficiently critical and
considers China's acquisition of this technology a potential threat to regional or
international security ,,ioo Furthermore, while the Bureau of Industry and Security
maintains a list of entities for which no dual-use exports are permitted,i °i the
Wassenaar Arrangement does not contain such lists and "it is the sovereign
1
decision of each country as to whether or not it makes a particular export." 02
Ultimately, as the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security admits, the
Wassenaar Arrangement merely "provides a venue in which governments can
consider collectively the implications of various transfers on their international and
regional security interests." 103 Given its lack of enforceable provisions and flawed
reporting mechanisms, the Wassenaar Arrangement is at best a "chat society, 104
and at worst, it is a preposterous system by which countries apprise other members
of willing buyers to which they refused to sell.O 5
111.
THE MODERN PLIGHT OF EXPORT CONTROLS

A. InternationalUndercutting
While the United States still has a large semiconductor production equipment
base, China can obtain all major types of semiconductorequipmentfrom non-U.S.
sources in Japanand Europe.
1
-George Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association

6

97. See Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 968 (Panel I Discussion and Questions and
Answers).

98. DSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 88, at 26.
99. See Export Controls,supra note 3, at 19.
100. Id. at 17.
101. See supra text accompanying note 72.
102. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 970, 973 (Panel I Discussion and Questions and
Answers). See also The Wassenaar Arrangement, supra note 90, art. 11(3).
FAQs, § 8, at
103. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, Wassenaar
http://www.bis.doc.gov/wassenaar/WASSFAQs.
html (last visited Aug. 7, 2003).

104. Richard Read, U.S. Trade, Security Interests Clash over Technology Exports to China, THE
Feb. 3, 2003, at A7, available at LEXIS, News Library, OREGNN File.
105. See supra text accompanying note 96.
106. See generally Hearings on US-Chma, supra note 2, at 1032 (prepared statement of George

OREGON IAN,
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Besides U.S. corporations, Japanese and European competitors produce and
sell the equipment, chemicals, gases, and films necessary for producing advanced
semiconductors. 10 7 Boosted by international investors and suppliers and an
accelerating demand from technology companies, ° six new semiconductor
foundries in China are expected to begin producing 0.18-micron chips in 2003 and
two others are progressing toward the production of 0.13-micron chips, 0 9 although
U.S. exporters report a ban on transfers to China of the equipment necessary for
producing those chips.1"° Two of China's leading foundries, SMIC and GSMC,'"
openly flaunt technology that is reportedly prohibited or delayed by U.S. export
controls epitomizing the ineffectiveness of restrictions on U.S. exporters.' i2
According to Shanghai's Semiconductor Manufacturing International
Corporation (SMIC), swiftly acquiring cutting-edge processing systems is not an
obstacle in the production of advanced chips. 1 3 SMIC CEO Richard Chang
reveals, "our solution is to import a lot of equipment from Europe. .the export
license usually takes from one week to two weeks for a European government. For
the USA, it's case by case. Sometimes it's three months, but the longest we have
experienced is six months."' i14 After its attempt to import equipment from Applied
Materials Inc. (Santa Clara, California) was thwarted by U.S. export controls in
2001, SMIC simply imported the identical technology from a company in Sweden
to construct its first plant.ii5 In 2002, to produce its next generation 0.13-micron
chips, SMIC imported equipment from ASML Co. of the Netherlands.' i6 Most
recently, German company Infineon Technologies reached an agreement with
SMIC to transfer its 0.1 -micron technology and expertise to SMIC in exchange
for an agreement from SMIC to only use the equipment to produce chips for
Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association).
107. See Id. at 1032-1033.
108. The China market for semiconductor equipment was $4 billion in 2001 and an estimated $7
billion in 2003. By 2010, China is expected to become the second largest market for semiconductors.
See, e.g., Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1121 (prepared statement of the Semiconductor
Equipment and Materials International).
109. See LaPedus and Fuller, supra note 25, at 4. See also SMIC to Complete 12" Silicon Wafer
Plants in Shanghai and Beying, SINOCAST, Apr. 9, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
I 10. See TI To Buy More Chinese-Made Products, supranote 25. See also Export Controls, supra
note 3, at 3 (discussing U.S. efforts to keep China two generations behind industry standards); See also
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International, supra note 29, at 1121.
111. SMIC and GSMC are China's newest and most advanced semiconductor foundries, and both
are wholly foreign owned. See Export Controls, supra note 3, at 12.
112. Mike Clendeni, China Foundry Turns to Europe for Advanced Chip Gear ELEC. ENG.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at I, available at http://www.eetimes.com/semi/news/0EG20011206S0044 (last
visited Aug. 25, 2003).
113. Export Controls, supranote 3, at 12.
114. Mike Clendeni, supranote 112, at I.
I15. See Read, supra note 104. See also Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1122 (prepared
statement of the Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International) (discussing SMIC's plans to
buy 50% of its equipment from U.S. sources, which were amended due to the bureaucratic delays
experienced by U.S. exporters).
116. SMIC Unveils 0. 13-Micron Chip Technology, TAIWAN ECON. NEWS, Dec. 17, 2002, available
at LEXIS, News Library, ALLASI File.
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lnfineon. 1 17 Monitoring the success of SMIC's initial facilities, the Chinese
government recently asked8 SMIC to construct a facility in Beijing and to complete
it within thirteen months.' 1
In addition to SMIC, Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation
(GSMC) is rapidly developing advanced semiconductor manufacturing
capabilities." 9 Overlooking U.S. suppliers encumbered by archaic export controls,
GSMC Vice Chairman Nasa Tsai divulges, "think how bad the Japanese economy
is
they love to sell." 20 Facing domestic economic pressures, Japan amended its
export regulations in 2001 to ease constraints on shipments of 0.18-micron
technology to China. 21 Relying on semiconductor manufacturing equipment
imported from Oki Electric Industry of Japan, GSMC is currently capable of
producing for 0.15-micron chips and plans to begin producing 0.13-micron chips
in 2 0 0 4 .22
The unimpeded growth of SMIC and GSMC exemplifies the futility of
unilateral U.S. export controls; James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) observes, "all other major suppliers - the Netherlands,
Germany and Japan - have told the U.S. that they will not block equipment sales
to China, and "they have repeatedly questioned the contribution of semiconductor
manufacturing equipment to military capabilities and proliferation and ask whether
there is still any strategic rationale for controlling these items. ''i 2s In addition to
their skepticism regarding the dangers posed by dual-use exports, European and
Asian governments harbor far less suspicion of China's military modernization
than U.S. officials. 124 Illustrating the irrelevance of U.S. export controls in the
twenty-first century, in the mid 1990s, Russia, China, India, and Israel routinely
complained to the State Department that U.S. export controls unfairly damaged
their economies; now such complaints are rare, implying that countries can easily
acquire computing power elsewhere. 125
B. U.S. Economic Losses
When U.S. companies such as Applied Materials Inc., the world's largest

117. Infineon to Transfer 0.1 I-Micron Technology to SMIC, SINOCAST, Apr. 2, 2003, available at
LEXIS, News Library, ALLASI File.
118. Loh Hui Yin, SMIC's Technology, Speed Impress China, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Feb. 10,
2003, availableat LEXIS, News Library, ALLASI File.
119 Craig Smith, China Finds Ways to Beat Chip Limits, N.Y TIMES, May 6, 2002, atC4.
120. Id.
121. See Mike Clendenin, China'sFabs Eye A Rule Change, ELEC. ENG. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2001, at
96.
122. Jack Robertson, China Fab to Launch with Advanced Technology, ELEC. ENG. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2002, at !.
123. Lewis, supra note 7, at 1022.
124. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1042 (prepared statement of Kathleen
A. Walsh, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stinson Center).
125. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at i117-18 (prepared statement of James
Lewis, Director, Technology Policy, Center for Strategic and International Studies).
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producer of semiconductor equipment, 12 are undercut by foreign suppliers, besides
failing to prevent China from developing advanced technologies, the policies
undermine U.S. economic interests.' 27 Mocking superannuated U.S. export
controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, SMIC executive Joseph Xie
explains, "we love to do business with the U.S., but we can't wait forever
Europe and Japan are getting the business."' 128 With Asia accounting for 60% of
sales from U.S. semiconductor equipment suppliers and China becoming Asia's
largest recipient of new semiconductor manufacturing investment, 129 U.S.
exporters of the equipment are disadvantaged relative to their foreign competitors.
When the U.S. vigorously scrutinized dual-use exports during the Cold War,
U.S. companies generally accepted the restrictions, since few developed countries
possessed advanced technologies, 130 and the U.S. maintained a large commercial
13
and technological edge over the countries that did possess those technologies. '
Moreover, the military applicability of technology was generally unmistakable in
the 1970s, and therefore military goods could be differentiated from commercial
goods. 32 Now, almost all IT products can be considered dual-use goods. A
semiconductor equipment manufacturers association insists, "semiconductor
manufacturing equipment and materials are indistinguishable from other types of
generic manufacturing equipment whose export would be restricted only as part of
a comprehensive economic embargo, not for reasons of national security ,133
Since the U.S. Commerce Department operates on a more restrictive export
control system than foreign governments, 134 and China is thus able to acquire
advanced dual-use technology from foreign sources, high-tech executives argue
that the only effect of U.S. controls is that it "interferes with our companies' ability
to succeed internationally 035 Without substantial changes to streamline the
interagency process for reviewing dual-use export licenses, the Semiconductor
Industry Association worries, "U.S. companies will increasingly fall behind in this
crucial market, and, by extension, the global market."' 136 Forecasting similar dire

126. Export Controls,supra note 3, at 13.
127. See supratext accompanying notes 120-21.
128. Smith, supranote 119, at C4.
129. See also Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1119, i 121-22 (prepared statement of the
Semiconductor Equipment and Matenals international).
130. See generally Export Controls,supra note 3, at 5-6 ("U.S. Companies created and dominated
the semiconductor equipment and materials industries until the early 1980s, when Japan increased
investment and Japanese companies gained a greater market share in several critical equipment and
materials industnes.").
131. Corr, supra note 12, at 452.
132. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1031 (prepared statement of George
Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association) ("Most IT products are purely civilian items,
which cannot, for these purposes, be distinguished from civilian applications such as automobiles.").
133. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1121 (prepared statement of
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials international).
134. See supratext accompanying note 120. See also Walsh, supra note 124.
135. Gerth and Schmitt, supranote 77, at A 14.
136. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1034 (prepared statement of George
Scalise, President, Semiconductor Industry Association). See also Clendenin, supra note 121.
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long term consequences of export controls on dual-use technology, Denis Simon of
the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in New York reckons, "the last thing we want
to do is treat China as a technological adversary and have them get technology
from elsewhere, and then find we're locked out of that system. ''i37
In 2001, China accounted for 1,300 of the 11,000 export applications
submitted to the Commerce Department, i38 and virtually all of the applications
were for dual-use goods. 139 Since corporations are unlikely to apply for an export
license unless they are confident that their request will be approved, 40 between
1997 and 2000, the dollar value of denied export licenses was only 0.4-0.5% of the
total value of the semiconductor equipment exported to China. i41 Nonetheless,
economic losses from denied licenses represent only a fraction of the cost to U.S.
corporations, since processing delays also compel Chinese companies to import
technology from non-U.S. sources.i 42 According to studies conducted by the
Institute for International Economics and the U.S. Import-Export Bank, the total
annual cost of unnecessary domestic export controls
for the U.S. economy is
43
somewhere between $10 billion and $40 billion.
IV

PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS

A. Trade and Investment Diversion Theory
Free-trade agreements deviate from
the multilateral principle of
nondiscrimination,and they can divert trade from more efficient to less efficient
butfavored import producers.
144
-Daniel Griswold, Cato Institute

Bilateral free trade agreements disregard the nondiscrimination principles of
the World Trade Organization (WTO),145 but provisions of the WTO Charter grant
exceptions for WTO members to negotiate bilateral agreements that explicitly
favor some countries over others.
Establishing the "most favored nation"
137 Read, supra note 104.
138. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 965 (Panel I Discussions and Questions
and Answers).
139. See, e.g., Leopold, supra note 31, at 92.
140. See, e.g., Export Controls,supra note 3, at 27
141. Id. Between 1997 and 2000, the U.S. Government reviewed almost $1.6 billion in
semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials licenses.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21. See also Hearingson US-China, supra note 2, at
1122 (prepared statement of Semiconductor Equipment and Materials international).
143. Broadbent, supra note i,at 51.
144. Griswold, supranote 16, at 1.
145. See UPALI Wickramasinghe, PreferentialTrade Agreements and the WTO (Paper prepared for
the Conference on Follow up to UNCTAD X South Asian Perspective, August 1-4, 2000) available at
http://www.lawnet.lk/articlesl
pdf/article6.pdf (last visited July 10, 2003).
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(MFN) 146 principle, Article I of the WTO Charter (the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1947 as amended in 1994) stipulates, "any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties."'' 47 However, Article XXIV(5) contains an exception
for countries to form free trade agreements and thus violate the MFN principle
provided that the agreements a) do not raise barriers to trade for non-contracting
parties, b) barriers to trade between contracting parties do not become more
restrictive, and c) interim agreements for FTAs include a plan for forming FTAs
"within a reasonable length of time." 148 Between 1948 and the Uruguay Round of
1994, WTO members negotiated only 124 free trade agreements under the Article
XXIV exception. 149 Interest in FTAs sharply accelerated after the Uruguay Round,
however, as over 130 such agreements have been announced since 1995, an
average of over 15 per year. i50
Although FTAs are legally compatible with the WTO Charter, economists
challenge the WTO's sanguine assumption that FTAs promote global economic
welfare.ISi In his seminal analysis of customs unions in 1950,152 economist Jacob
Viner hypothesized that the global economic outcome of FTAs is dependent on
153
whether beneficial "trade creation" or inefficient "trade diversion" prevails.
First, Viner recognized the constructive possibilities of trade creation; by
eliminating trade barriers and thus removing market distortions, the agreements
promote a shift in the locus of production from high cost points to low cost points
within the trade area.154 At the same time, Viner warned of the negative, inefficient
effects of trade diversion that arise when the reduced trade barriers prompt one
party to the agreement to import from the other party rather than a more efficient

146. Id. Since GATT was designed as an economic arrangement, the Charter sought to de-politicize
trade by ensuring non-discriminatory trade policies among members.
147 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 art. [(I), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 50

U.N.T.S. 188, art. 1(I).
148. Id. art. XXIV(5). See also Sungloon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and
Multilateralism, 42 HARV INT'L L. J. 419 (2001).
149. Wickramasinghe, supra note 145, at 3. During the Uruguay Round (UR), the WTO recognized

the value of FTAs in advancing the free trade principles of the WTO and reaffirmed that FTAs must not
damage parties outside of the agreement.
150. Griswold, supra note 16, at 3.
151. Wickramasinghe, supra note 145, at 5. (Reaffirming the WTO's position,

1995 Secretariat

study contends, "Regional and multilateral integration initiatives are compliments rather than
altematives inthe pursuit of more open trade.").
152. Customs unions are slightly different than free trade agreements in that members conduct free
trade between themselves and maintain common tariffs to parties outside of the agreement, while FTAs
allow parties to establish their own trade policies regarding tariffs for countries not included in the
agreement. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 15, at 2.
153. See generally JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNIONS ISSUE (1950), reprinted in TRADING
BLOCS: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ANALYZING PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 105 (Jagdish

Bhagwati et al. eds., 1999).
154. Id. at 107
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third party 155 Given the complexity of specific agreements, studies attempting to
determine whether trade creation or trade diversion dominates have generally
yielded inclusive results or groundless speculation. 56 Despite Viner's venerated
trade creation/trade diversion theory, which suggests that preferential free trade
agreements among WTO members are sometimes inefficient for the global
economy "from a political viewpoint, whether a regional trade bloc results
in a net
' 57
economic benefit to the world economy may be of little consequence." 1
Overlooking the potential negative global consequences of trade diversion,
countries eyeing the political and economic gains of trade creation are driving the
proliferation of FTAs.
Even if inefficient global trade diversion results, FTAs advance American
economic interests by creating a level playing field for U.S. exporters that are
disadvantaged by FTAs that do not include the United States. 15 8 For instance,
proponents of the U.S.-Chile FTA 9 argue that U.S. exporters are disadvantaged
relative to Canadian exporters that do not encounter tariffs under the Canada-Chile
FTA. 160 From a homeland security perspective, since September 11, the Bush
administration has regarded FTAs and the formation of open markets as the
optimal long-term strategy for combating international terrorism. 16tAdding to the
myriad potential domestic economic and political gains of trade creation, FTAs
spur market-based reforms in developing countries and thereby open markets for
U.S. firms, 162 establish a template for broader free trade negotiations, 163 and
provide a "safety valve" for the multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO that
often become "long, tortuous, and uncertain." 164
Although trade diversion is considered an inefficient outcome of free trade
agreements for the global economic system, for national security reasons, countries
accrue domestic benefits when FTAs divert trade from the most efficient
producers.1 65
Given the enormous construction costs of semiconductor

155. Id.See also Cooper, supra note 15, at 9
156. Richard H. Steinberg, Antidotes to Regionalism: Responses to Trade Diversion Effects of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 29 STAN. J INT'L L. 315, 321 (1993).
157. Id.at 322.
158. See Griswold, supra note 16, at 5.
159 The U.S.-Chile FTA was signed in June 2002 and, once implemented, will eliminate bilateral
trading barriers between the U.S. and Chile. See U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Chile
Sign Historic Free Trade Agreement (June 6, 2003), at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/06/03-37.pdf
(last visited July 30, 2003).
160. See Cooper, supra note 15, at 3. See also Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 5, 1996,
Can.-Chile, 36 I.L.M. 1067 (1997).
161. See, e.g., Security Issues Fuel U.S. Drive for Free Trade Agreements, AFR. NEWS, Apr. 2,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
162. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 16, at 6.
163. See Id at 5. See also Cooper, supra note 15, at 6.
164. Griswold, supra note 16, at 4. See also Cooper, supra note 15, at 4.
165. According to David Ricardo's famous theory of comparative advantage, global economic
efficiency is maximized when each country produces the product in which it has
comparative
advantage. With trade liberalization and free trade between all countries, all participants theoretically
improve economic efficiency and consumer welfare. See, e.g., Steinberg, supra note 156, at319.
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manufacturing facilities and the industry's unpredictable market trends, U.S.
computer and electronics companies will likely continue outsourcing
manufacturing to foundries that mass-produce computer chips. 166 However, by
manipulating the flow of foreign direct investment and trade via FTAs,' 67 the U.S.
could theoretically influence China's attractiveness as a base for semiconductor
production. Insofar as developing countries "signal to the rest of the world that
they are serious about embracing global competition" when they sign an FTA with
the U.S., 168 FTAs cultivate stable economic policies and construct substitutes for
international investors seeking to build foundries that can support the world's
technology corporations. According to a survey conducted by the Bureau of
Business Research at American International College, "political stability is the
most important factor American companies consider when locating operations
abroad."' 169 Currently the political instability and economic uncertainty that
pervades much of the developing world discourages foreign investment,' 70 while
state-based economic plans engender confidence in foreign
China's ambitious,
71
investors. 1

Besides diverting foreign investment by supporting market reforms and
stabilizing political agendas in developing countries, FTAs restructure U.S. tariff
schedules and consequently provide incentives for U.S. companies to import from
some countries over others. Since the U.S. accounts for approximately only 20%
of China's exports, 172 the effect of revamping tariffs on China's high-tech
exporting centers would likely not be as great as the effect of promoting political
stability elsewhere. 173 Nonetheless, when tariffs on high-tech goods imported from
FTA partners are eliminated, it enhances the attractiveness of importing from the
FTA partner relative to China, even if China is the world's most efficient producer
of the imported good. 174 In the long run, the political and economic effects of

166. Building a new foundry costs up to $2 billion (semiconductor equipment accounts for 80% of
the cost). U.S. technology companies reduce costs and thus become more competitive in the global
market by outsourcing, and U.S. equipment suppliers gain access to markets with reduced export
restrictions. See generally Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1121-22 (prepared statement of
Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International).
167. Cf Matthew W Barrier, Regionalization: The Choice of a New Millennium, 9 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J. 25 (2000) (Free trade agreements have been "tolne of the principal factors that has
accelerated the globalization or transnational extension of FDI markets.").
168. Griswold, supranote 16, at 5.
169. In LocatingOverseas, Stability Tops List, 87 CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 8 (1995).
170. See, e.g., Carlos Lozada, Latin America, FOREIGN POL'Y, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 18.
171. See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 27, at 3. See also Export Controls, supra note 3, at II.
172. U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2002), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publicatons/factbook/geos/ch.html#Econ (last visited July 20, 2003).
173. Investors consider many factors besides tariffs, such as political stability, economic stability,
labor force, and environmental conditions. See generally Edward Crenshaw, Foreign Investment as
Dependent Variable: Determinants of Foreign Investment and Capital Penetration in Developing
Nations, 1967-1978, 69 SOC. FORCES 1169 (1991).
174. According to NAFTA rules of origin, for example, for an item to become duty-free, a
minimum percentage of the content must be produced in the FTA region, with the exact percentage
depending on the type of good. The alternative to meeting rules of origin requirements is for exporters
is to accept MFN provisions without meeting the rules of NAFTA. In 2000, the average tariff on
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FTAs with developing countries may induce foreign investors to establish hightech manufacturing bases in a country with which the U.S. has an FTA rather than
a potential adversary With high-tech investments reaching strategic FTA partners,
advanced technology would not be as accessible to militaries of countries targeted
by dual-use technology export controls, 7 5 and U.S. technology corporations would
not be hindered by unilateral export controls that favor their foreign competitors.176
B. Diversionary Effects of NAFTA
As an extension to the 1988 free trade agreement with Canada, 177 in 1993
Congress approved the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that will
eliminate tariffs on trade among the United States, Canada, and Mexico by 2 0 0 8 .178
As East Asian government officials express concern that trade and investment is
being diverted from Asia to Mexico, United States Trade Representative
(USTR) 179 Robert Zoellick proclaims, "We are creating competition in
' °
liberalization with the United States at the center of a network of initiatives."iS
Bolstered by NAFTA, Mexico is indeed institutionalizing its market reforms, but
high-tech investment diversion is minimal, given Mexico's relatively unskilled
labor pool and underdeveloped infrastructure.iSi Nonetheless, Mexico's actions
since NAFTA s implementation on January 1, 1994 underscore the potential for
FTAs to generate the economic and political stability that foreign investors
demand. i82
By reinforcing Mexico's dedication to market reforms, NAFTA creates a
more predictable business environment, reduces investment risk, and ultimately
encourages foreign direct investment. i83 After decades of restricting foreign access
NAFTA goods was 0.28% compared to the U.S. average MFN tariff of 4.08%. See generally OLIVIER
CADOT, ET AL., WORLD BANK, ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF NAFTA's RULES OF ORIGIN 9-15 (2002).
175. China's modernization program, in particular, depends on attracting foreign investment to
develop "pockets of excellence, where advances in technology are leveraged for benefits in potential
military conflicts. Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 949 (prepared statement of Lisa Bronson,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counter proliferation).
176. See, e.g., Hearings on US-China, supra note 2, at 1028 (prepared statement of George Scalise,
President, Semiconductor Industry Association). See also supra text accompanying note 120.
177 Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 (entered into force Jan. 1,

1989).
178. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993)
Annex 302.2.
179. The USTR is the principal trade negotiator and policy advisor of the United States and is
responsible for developing trade policy to benefit economic growth. U.S. Trade Representative, About
USTR, at http://www.ustr.gov/about-ustr/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 1I, 2003).
180. USTR Robert B. Zoellick, Speech on NAFTA Before the National Foreign Trade Council 8
(July 26, 2001), transcript available at http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/zoellick_7.PDF (last
visited July 10, 2003) [hereinafter Zoellick].
181. See generally Kathryn L. McCall, What is Asia Afraid Of? The Diversionary Effect of
NAFTA Rules of Origin on Trade Between the United States and Asia, 25 CAL. W INT'L L.J. 389,415
(1995).
182. See Griswold, supra note 16, at 5.
183. See Chlang-feng Lin, Investment in Mexico: A Springboard Toward the NAFTA Market An
Asian Perspective, 22 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 73, 118 (1996).
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to domestic markets, Mexico initiated a series of economic reforms between 1988
and 1994 during the presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari.18 4 As a U.S. educated
economist, Salinas' central economic strategy involved attracting foreign
investment and, after failing to secure Japanese and European investment, he
recognized that the U.S. was the most promising source of such investment. 185 To
advance his free market ideology during his term, Salinas eliminated the budget
deficit, privatized Mexico's banks,
eliminated trade barriers ahead of GATT
86
timelines, and signed NAFTA. 1
Only a few weeks after Ernesto Zedillo succeeded Salinas as president in
December 1994, an economic and political crisis erupted, challenging Mexico's
novel commitment to maintaining an open economy 187 With banks already
floundering due to dangerously low reserves, 8 8 the assassination of presidential
candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio extended the financial quagmire to the political
189
arena, and $10 billion gushed out of Mexico's economy within four weeks.
When Zedillo reacted by allowing the peso to devalue on December 20, 19 9 4 '90 an
additional $70 billion was transferred out of Mexico over the following twenty
months, triggenng alarm and panic among foreign investors and political
leaders.' 9 ' Investors recalled that when Mexico encountered an economic crisis in
19 8 1 ,92 the government reacted by imposing protectionist tariffs of 100% on
American goods and enforcing strict licensing regulations. 193 During the 19941995 crisis, however, there was "every indication that the country would not help
itself by trying to reverse gears and return to the government-controlled economy
that [had] already failed in generating prosperity and healthy distribution of
income."' 19 4 Rather than resorting to the protectionist measures of the past, Mexico
negotiated a $51 billion support package from the U.S. and international financial
institutions, allowed its exchange rate to float to promote macroeconomic stability
and imposed strict reserve rate requirement on banks. 195 After eighteen months,
184. Mexico's 1917 constitution limited foreign ownership of Mexican resources, Mexico
nationalized U.S. owned railroads and oil wells in the 1930s, and along with most of the region in the
"lost decade" of the 1980s, Mexico futilely attempted to protect inefficient industries. PETER WINN,
AMERICAS: THE CHANGING FACE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 488 (2d ed. 1999).
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., Sergio Sarrmento, Mexico Inevitable Transformation, 20 WASH. Q. Autumn 1997,
at 130.
187. Id. at 131.
188. See generally Francisco Gil-Diaz, The Origins of Mexico 1994 FinancialCrisis, 17 CATO J.,
Winter 1998, at http://www.cato.org/pubs/joumal/cj 17n3-14.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2003).
189 Sarmiento, supra note 186, at 131.
190. After the peso was devalued, inflation and interest rates skyrocketed, thereby exacerbating the
economic mayhem. See Gil-Diaz, supra note 188.
191. Sarmiento, supranote 186, at 132.
192. After the oil boom ended in the 1980s, Mexico was left with one of the largest foreign debts in
the world. By 1982, Mexico could not pay its foreign debts, causing foreign loans to cease and the
economy to collapse. WINN, supra note 184, at 220.
193. U.S.
Trade
Representative,
NA FTA
Overview,
4,
at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/overview.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
194. Sarmiento, supranote 186, at 137. See also Griswold, supra note 16, at 5.
195. See
World
Bank,
Crisis Management:
Mexico
1994-1995
(2001),
at
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Mexico resumed its pattern of economic growth, 196 and Ernesto Zedillo
recognized, "NAFTA has been crucial in transforming Mexico into one of the
97
world's biggest exporting powers."1
Aside from fostering economic stability and a more secure investment
environment, as a comparison between the 1981 and 1994 financial crises
illustrates, NAFTA's reductions in tariffs make Mexico a more attractive place
from which to export to the United States.' 98 When negotiations for NAFTA were
promulgated in 1991, East Asian leaders immediately recognized that that
agreement handicaps firms outside of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. 99 Since
NAFTA promotes diversion of trade and investment from East Asia, political
leaders forecasted decay for the export-driven East Asian economies; 200 most
notably, the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 20 1 estimated that NAFTA
would induce a $2 billion drop in ASEAN exports to the United States. 202 Since
investors would have an incentive to relocate factories to Mexico, Japan's Ministry
of International Trade and Industry projected an annual diversion of $10 billion in
foreign direct investment from East Asia to Mexico for 1995-2001.203
Given the complexity of NAFTA, as it addresses not only trade but also
technical standards, environmental issues, labor rights, and intellectual property, 04
economic studies of trade and investment diversion are imperfect and would
depend on untenable counterfactual theories. 20 5 For producers of sensitive
advanced technologies, however,
Mexico's
substandard technological
infrastructure may erode the incentive to transfer investment from East Asia to
Mexco. 20 6 Between 1998 and 2002, U.S. imports of semiconductors from Mexico
remained steady at around $900 million, while U.S. imports of semiconductors
from China rose from $486 million to $729 million.20 7 On a macro scale,
meanwhile, total imports from Mexico rose from $95 billion to $135 billion
between 1998 and 2002,208 and annual FDI inflows into Mexico averaged $11.7
http://wwwi.worldbank.org/finance/ assets/images/CrisisMan.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
196. Id.
197 Zoellick, supra note 180, at 5.
198. See, e.g., McCall, supra note 18 1, at 411.
199. See Jisu Kim, Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on East Asia: A Korean
Perspective, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 681, 888 (1993).
200. McCall, supra note 181, at 390.
201. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a group of ten Asian countries that
aims to accelerate economic growth and promote regional peace and stability through political dialogue
and cooperation. ASEAN Secretariat, Overview: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, at
http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (last visited July 30,2003).
202. McCall, supra note 181, at 413.
203. Id. at413.
204. See Steinberg, supra note 156, at 321.
205. See Gary Hufbauer and Jacqueline McFadyn, Proceedings of the Canada-United States Law
Institute Conference: NAFTA Revisited: Judging NAFTA, 23 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 15, 14-15 (1997).
206. See McCall, supra note 181, at 415.
207. U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: U.S. Imports from Mexico 1998-2002, available
at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/c2lO.html
(last visited Jan.
26, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. Importsfrom Mexico].
208. US. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: U.S. Imports from China 1998-2002, available
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billion from 1994 to 2002, which is over three times the average annual amount of
Mexico's FDI during the seven years prior to the agreement. 2°
While it remains possible that Mexico would have tripled its annual FDi
inflows without NAFTA and that very little of that investment was diverted from
China's expanding economy, NAFTA is succeeding in bolstering Mexico's
evolving market oriented policies and supporting the efficient use of Mexico's
capital resources. 2 0 As USTR Robert Zoellick observes, NAFTA is effective in
"creating a more stable and predictable environment for investment and leading
foreign capital toward more productive and efficient uses."2 1' Over time, such
foreign investment is expected to upgrade Mexico's infrastructure and industries,
and, in turn, boost Mexico's educational system to equip the country's workforce
with the technological skills necessary for competing in the high-tech global
economy. 212
C. The U.S.Jordan Free Trade Agreement
With a commitment to free trade legislation and a competitive and open trading
environment, we have an unbeatablepropositionfor investors.

-Dr. Bassem Awadallah, Jordan Minister of Planning

213

While NAFTA, with its inclusion of Mexico, is likely diverting investment in
low-skilled manufacturing, 214 the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement promises to
also divert high tech investments.2i5 Signed on October 24, 2000 and enacted on
December 17 2001, the U.S.-Jordan FTA rewards Jordanian King Abdullah Il's
commitment to developing a high-tech economy and stimulates foreign investment
in Jordan's budding technology sectors by eliminating tariff and non-tariffs
barriers to bilateral trade in virtually all industrial goods and agricultural products

at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statstics/product/enduse/imports/c5700.html

(last visited Jan.

26, 2004).

209. U.S. Importsfrom Mexico, supra note 208.
210. After NAFTA, Mexico was inspired to sign its own free trade agreements with Chile, the
European Union, Israel, Bolivia, Columbia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Costa Rica, and Uruguay. See generally Secretary of Economics, National Development Plan 20012006, at http://www.economia.gov.mx/?P=-1317 (last visited Nov. 9, 2003). See also supra text
accompanying notes 207-9 (More efficient use of capital resources is illustrated by the reaction to the
1994-1995 economic crisis.).
2 f1.Zoellick, supra note 180, at 6.
212. Peter F Romero, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Remarks to InterAmerican Development Bank Santiago, Chile (Mar. 19, 2001) transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/rm/2001/1785.htm
213. Experts Assert 'Enormous Potentialfor Investment in Jordan, AME INFO - ME COMPANY
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 20, 2003, availableat LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
214. See, e.g., McCall, supra note 181, at 415.
215. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on
the Establishment of
Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.-Jordan, 2000 U.S.T. LEXIS 160
[hereinafter U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement].
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within 10 years. 2 16 As it draws investment into Jordan, the FTA supports Jordanian
King Abdullah 11's fundamental strategic goal to "shift Jordan's economy from
one of dependence on foreign aid to one of self-reliance. ''2i 7
Building on the economic reforms of his father King Hussein, since assuming
the throne in 1999, King Abdullah II has aggressively trumpeted an economic
strategy that focuses on "integration of the private sector into the industrial
policymaking framework, export expansion through increased competitiveness,
and the facilitation of private sector driven growth, which [ensures] that Jordan's
legal and regulatory policies [match] requirements for global economic
participation., 2 18 By opening most sectors to 100% foreign ownership, reducing
inflation from 25.6% in 1989 to 1.8% in 2001, and implementing strategies to
support Jordan's nascent technology sectors, Jordan is creating "the necessary
environment to allow [Jordan's] businesses and citizens to utilize [the]
international agreements in the new knowledge-based global economy ,,219 At a
January 2003 economic conference, Director of the Economic and Development
assured
Division of Jordan's Royal Hashemite Court Dr. Khaled Al Wazani
220
Jordan is open for business.
investors, "today's message is clear
Since opening markets to U.S. investors, Jordan has attracted capital and
technological expertise from powerful U.S. high-tech corporations. Recognizing
the enormous potential in Jordan, Intel CEO Craig Barrett sponsored an Internet
laboratory at the University of Jordan in October 2002221 and urged the Kingdom
to become "the model for the whole region in the IT sector. 222 Similarly, Cisco
announced a $1 million investment in Jordan's High Tech Fund to expand the
"Connecting Jordanians" program, which aims to connect every Jordanian school,
college, university, and IT community center on a high-speed broadband network
by 2005.223 Additionally Oracle donated $2 million in software to Jordanian
universities.224 Finally, Sun Microsystems unveiled plans to establish a "business
incubator" with Cisco, Oracle, and local investors to educate and support emerging

216. Id at Annex 2. 1.
217 King Abdullah II, Heir Jordan: One State Story of Economic Transformation, 24 HARV
INT'L REV Winter 2003, at 17
218. Id. at 15. See also EMBASSY OF JORDAN, POLITICAL AND SocIo-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
BUILDING A NEW MODEL, at http://wwwjordanembassyus.org/new/aboutjordan/er2.shtm (last visited
July 30, 2003).
supra note 217, at 15-17 (for example, in 1999 Jordan launched the REACT
219 Abdullah I1,
Initiative: Regulatory Framework, Enabling Environment, Advancement Programs, Capital and
Finance, Human Resource Development).
220. Experts Assert 'Enormous Potentialfor Investment in Jordan, supra note 213.
221. John Mason, Intel Brings its Cool Silicon to the Hot Sands of Jordan, ELECTRONIC
ENGINEERING TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at 26.
222. Baker, supra note 19 See also Intel Says Jordan IT Sector Holds Promise, REUTERS, June 17,
2001, available at http://www.intaj.net/news/readnews.cfm?id=137 (last visited July 8, 2003).
223. Francesca Cinaci, Jordan's First IT Forum Ends with Challenging 'to do List, JORDAN
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2000, available at http://www.jordanembassyus.org/03262000002.htm (last visited
July 8, 2003).
224. Id.
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Jordanian technology companies.225
As U.S. corporations eagerly contribute to Jordan's high-tech aspirations,
Jordan's high-tech sectors are also enticing non-U.S. international investors. In
February 2003, Jordan and Switzerland launched the Swiss-Jordanian Business-toBusiness platform "Trado, a platform that facilitates trade between the IT sectors
226
of Jordan and Switzerland by creating a website for business contacts.
Additionally, in January 2003 King Abdullah II welcomed Volker Jung, President
of the Board of Directors of German technology company Seimens, to explore
investment opportunities in telecommunications, information technology, and
energy 227 During his visit, Jung praised King228Abdullah 1l's dedication to the IT
sector and his innovative educational reforms.
With Jordan's bold economic reforms and the incentive of a free trade
agreement, total U.S. imports from Jordan skyrocketed from $16 million in 1998 to
$412 million in 2002 and imports of semiconductors crept from $0 in 2001 to
$39,000 in 2002.229 Underscoring the success of Jordan's investment initiatives,
after attracting $60 million in foreign direct investment in 2001, the Kingdom is
now projecting FDI inflows of $150 million in 2004.230 Summarizing Jordan's
extraordinary growth in trade and investment, in June 2003, USTR Robert Zoellick
trade can drive economic reforms
declared, "Jordan is an excellent example of how' 231
and growth, creating jobs, prosperity, and hope.
D. Prospects ofAdditional Free Trade Agreements
I The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
On January 15, 2003, the USTR concluded negotiations on a free trade
agreement with Singapore, 232 a city-state that is precipitously losing high-tech
Typifying the abrupt decline of
investors to China's explosive markets.
Singapore's semiconductor sector, after importing $3.31 billion in semiconductors
225. Id. The consulting services are available for companies fewer than four years old with fewer
than 50 employees. Services are free for the first year with an annual fee thereafter.
226. Information Technology Association of Jordan, Trado Launch Culminates the Jordan-Swiss
IT Partnership (Feb. 2, 2003), at http://www.intaj.netlnewslreadnews.cfm?id=633 (last visited July 8,
2003).
227. Jordan's King Holds Talks with Siemens Chief BBC MONITORING MID. E. POL., Jan. 5,
2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, BBCMIR File.
228. Id.
229. U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: U.S. Imports from Jordan 1998-2002, available
at http://www.census.govlforeign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/c51i0.html (last visited Jan.
26, 2004).
230. Mason, supra note 222, at 26.
23 I. Jeffrey Sparshott, Free Trade Seen as Boon to MidEast, WASH. TIMES, June 21, 2003, at C I1.
232. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6; 2003, U.S.-Sing., available at
http://www.mti.gov.sg/public/PDF/CMT/FTA USSFTAAgreementFinal.pdf (last visited July 2,
2003);
See e.g., U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, QUICK FACTS: THE U.S.-SINGAPORE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(2003), at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Singapore/final/factsheet.pdf (last visited July 2, 2003).
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from Singapore in 2000, the U.S. only imported $1.27 billion in semiconductors in
2002.233 By eliminating most tariffs immediately upon entry into force, phasing out
the remaining tariffs over three to ten years, and committing Singapore to enact a
law regulating anti-competitive business practices, 234 the USTR expects the FTA
to fortify Singapore's faltering high-tech sectors and "provide a secure, predictable
legal framework for U.S. investors operating in Singapore. '235
While Hong Kong is allowing its high-tech production facilities to migrate to
Mainland China, Singapore is battling valiantly to avoid a "manufacturing
exodus." 236 In an attempt to retain its fourteen semiconductor manufacturing plants
and facilitate the construction of new factories, in 2001 the government began
implementing a proactive economic strategy that includes setting aside sixty
hectares of land in northern Singapore for semiconductor factories and
237
constructing a new facility to produce high-grade purified water for the plants.
The allure of China's market continues to threaten such ambitions, however in
March 2003, Singapore's Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation
and exploring investment
announced that it is closing its oldest plant in Singapore
23
opportunities in China to produce cutting-edge chips. 8
For a government and economy that is highly dependent on foreign investors
for capital and technology the economic tide could be disastrous; Singapore's
post-independence political-economic strategy has relied on the state's ability to
leverage its full-service industrial parks to attract export processing plants of
foreign high-tech corporations. 239 The prospect of exporting goods from those
industrial parks to the United States tariff-free would invariably enhance the
attractiveness of investing in Singapore. Already, Barry Sim of Singapore's
Economic Development Board (EDB), a government agency that promotes foreign
investment, maintains, "we have all the elements of a global semiconductor
industry in place in Singapore. .chip-making is suitable for Singapore because it
isn't labor intensive, and it requires highly skilled and educated workers. 240 The
FTA with the United States will add one more attractive element to Singapore'
semiconductor industry and support the small city-state that "not only practices
free trade but ardently promotes its within every audience of its economic
233. U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: U.S. Imports from Singapore 1998-2002,
available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/c5590.htmi (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
234. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, supra note 232, art. 2.2, art. 12.1(1), art.
12.2(I).
235. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FREE TRADE WITH SINGAPORE: AMERICA'S FIRST FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT WITH ASIA 4 (2002), at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/asia-pacific/2002-12-13-

singapore facts.pdf (last visited July 18, 2003).
236. See Bruce Einhom, SingaporeSticks With its Chip Program,BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 5, 2001,
LEXIS, News Library, BWONL File.
237. Id.
238. See Lee, supra note 23.
239. See Christopher M. Dent, Singapore Foreign Economic Policy: The Pursuit of Economic
Security, 23 CONTEMPORARY SE. ASIA. J. INT'L & STRATEGIC AFF
Premier.

240. Einhom, supra note 236.

8 (2001), at Academic Search
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diplomacy

,,24i

2. The U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)
While the U.S.-Singapore FTA could revitalize Singapore's fleeing
semiconductor manufacturing industry negotiations for a trade agreement with
Central America could boost nascent high-tech sectors in a manner paralleling the
U.S.-Jordan FTA. On January 8, 2003, USTR Robert Zoellick announced the
commencement of negotiations on a free trade agreement with five Central
American countries: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua. 242 At a press conference, Zoellick pronounced, "This FTA will
reinforce free-market reforms in the region. The growth stimulated by trade and
the openness of an agreement
will help deepen democracy, the rule of law, and
243
sustainable development."
The five Central American countries in the envisaged U.S.-Central American
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) have been liberalizing their economies over the
past ten years, and now none of those countries imposes a tariff higher than
10%. 244 After the region was devastated by civil wars and economic mayhem in
the 1980s, the five Central American members are all embryonic democracies that
are rapidly expanding their economic freedoms.245 An FTA would reward the
region's political and economic progress, 46 advance further reforms, and allay the
region's escalating skepticism of the market economy and the non-interventive
state. 47
Among the Central American high-tech industries included in the proposed
U.S.-CAFTA, Costa Rica's developing industries exhibit the most potential for
attracting high-tech foreign investment. After imposing tariffs on computers of
133%, Costa Rica's government slashed tariffs on high-tech products to 10% in the
mid 1980s.248 Since then, Intel Corporation opened a $370 million semiconductor
manufacturing facility in San Jose, Costa Rica, and Intel's Pentium computer chips
have passed coffee and bananas as Costa Rica's leading export. 249 Following

241. Dent, supra note 239.
242. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED STATES AND CENTRAL AMERICAN NATIONS LAUNCH
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS (Jan. 8, 2003), at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2003/Oi/03-

0l.htm (last visited July 24, 2003).
243. Id.
244. How to Trade Up, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 15, 2003, at 36.
245. Griswold, supra note 16, at 12. See also U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,

FREE TRADE WITH
CENTRAL AMERICA 1 (2003), at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/camerica/2003-01-08-cafta-

facts.PDF (last visited July 31, 2003) ("Oppression, violence, and dictators on both the left and right
have given way to commitment to democracy in Latin America.").
246. Griswold, supra note 16, at 12.
247. Cf WINN, supra note 184, at 603 (In Latin America, "there are growing doubts that the
neoliberal market economy and non-interventive state are capable of redressing fundamental problems
of inequality and environmental degradation.").
248. See Geri Smith, Who Says the Chips Are Down?" Despite A Slump, Costa Rica Sees a Bright
Future in Technology, Bus. WK. INT'L EDITIONS: LATIN AMERICA, Sept. 3, 2001, at 26.
249. Id. Intel's investment is so substantial that national income accounts in Costa Rica are
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Intel's leadership, over 140 locally owned software development companies have
arisen in Costa Rica, and those companies now export $50 million in high-tech
goods. 250 Validating the advancements in Costa Rica's high-tech industries, in
2002 the U.S. imported $448 million in semiconductors from Costa Rica, up from
a mere $41 million in 1998.251 Reiterating his country's commitment to supporting
international investors and upholding a dedication to global trade, after an
economic downturn in 2001, General Director of the Costa Rican Investment
Board Anabel Gonzalez conceded, "the only way for a small economy like ours to
advance is to integrate with the world economy for better or worse."25 2 An FTA
with the United States would foster Costa Rica's integration with the world
economy and present incentives for more international investors to employ Costa
Rica high-tech industries.
V CONCLUSION: DUAL USE FTAs
Nations are deeply interested in the use of information technologies to gain
asymmetric advantage over the U.S. Export controls do nothing to help manage
this risk, as they cannot catch the technologies involved.
-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Panel Report

253

China's state-sponsored technological ascendancy continues to vex defense
of
officials in the twenty-first century 254 but U.S. export controls are incapable 255
counteracting the investment incentives proffered by China's government.
Fundamentally the unilateral policy framework underlying export controls
established during the Cold War is inappropriate for an economy that demands a
global perspective, and China is easily overcoming the burden of U.S. export
controls to develop a thriving semiconductor production base upon which it can
modernize the People's Liberation Army and attain an asymmetric edge in military
conflict. 256 In today's global economy, there are few, if any dual-use technologies

sometimes calculated with and without Intel. See also Lozada, supra note 170, at 20.
250. Smith, supranote 248.
25 1. U.S. Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics: US.Importsfrom Costa Ricafrom 1998-2002,
(last
available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/2230.htmi
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
252. Smith, supranote 248.
253. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, supra note 44, at 5.
254. See supratext accompanying note 44; see also Leopold, supra note 31.
255. See LIEBERMAN supra note 27" see also Export Controls, supra note 3, at 15 (discussing
China's manufacturing capabilities, including the ability to produce custom-made integrated circuits
that are not subject to foreign export controls).
256. See generally Export Controls,supra note 3 (describing how development of advanced semiconductor facilities improves China's military industrial base by enabling China, for example, to
enhance current and future weapons systems); see also CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, supra
note 44, at 5 (stating that export controls fail to manage the risk presented to United States national
security by other nations interested in using information technology to gain an advantage over the
United States).
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in which the U.S. is the sole possessor, necessitating an entirely new paradigm for
defense trade policy 257 Whereas global competition defeats myopic attempts to
mitigate national security risks through dual-use export controls, FTAs afford the
opportunity to leverage that competition to nourish viable substitutes for
international high-tech investors in strategically chosen regions.
By undercutting U.S. export controls and sanctioning sales of advanced
semiconductor manufactunng equipment to China, the policies of foreign
governments have "rendered many U.S. controls on exports to China essentially
unilateral, thus neutralizing their utility as constraints on Chinese acquisition of
dual-use technology ,258 Since those archaic export controls are essentially
unilateral, besides failing to moderate national security concerns, they provide
competitive advantages for non-U.S. companies that are not subject to draconian
high-tech export controls. Ultimately, the dual-use export control system that once
succeeded during the Cold War, is now not only detrimental to U.S. technological
corporate interests, but it is also ineffective for addressing national security
concerns.
While U.S. export controls fail to deter foreign investors from establishing
sophisticated semiconductor production facilities in China, 259 free trade agreements
foster the growth of alternate destinations for their investment. After NAFTA,
Mexico tripled its annual FDI inflows, 260 and after the U.S.-Jordan FTA, Jordan
tripled its projected inflows of FD1.26i Whether the foreign investment flowing into
Mexico and Jordan would have otherwise reached China to augment the Chinese
government's modernization efforts is impossible to prove through economic
analysis, 262 but the existence of an FTA undoubtedly engenders investor
confidence in those countries. 263 The negotiated U.S.-Singapore FTA could deliver
similar results and resuscitate Singapore's semiconductor industry by offering
investors an incentive for constructing export centers in Singapore rather than
China.26 Similarly the proposed FTA with Costa Rica would buttress Costa
Rica's nascent high-tech industry and thereby nourish another alternate for
international high-tech investors. 265
In contrast to the defunct unilateral perspective of export controls, by
negotiating and implementing FTAs with strategically chosen partners, the U.S.
operates on the now relevant global perspective to elevate competition for China's
257. See supra Part Ill(A) (discussing various Japanese and European companies that have supplied
China with materials necessary to produce advanced semiconductors); see also supra text
accompanying notes 129.
258. See supra Part IV(A).
259. DSB FINAL REPORT, supra note 88 at 26.
260. See Export Controls, supra note 3 at 12. (Providing statistics concerning the ownership of
China's existing semiconductor foundries. All existing foundries are either partnership between
foreign investors and the Chinese government or 100% foreign owned.).
261. Id.
262. Mason supranote 221.
263. See Steinberg, supra note 156, at 320-322.
264. See supra text accompanying note 173; See supra Part IV(D)(l).
265. See supra Part IV(D)(2).
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burgeoning semiconductor sector and promote substitutes for international
investors. As a foreign trade policy, FTAs thus appropriately protect the economic
interests of U.S. corporations 266 and simultaneously divert the foreign investment
upon which China's military transformation depends.267

266. See supra text accompanying notes 165 166.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 28 and 175.

